Papers

(35) Colombo, M., & Weinberger, N. (accepted). Discovering Brain Mechanisms Using Network Analysis and Causal Modeling. Minds and Machines [preprint]

(34) Colombo, M. (online first). Bayesian cognitive science, predictive brains, and the nativism debateSynthese.

(33) Klein, D., & Colombo, M. (forthcoming). Mystery and the Evidential Impact of UnexplainablesEpisteme. [preprint] [This article has been discussed by Tania Lombrozo in 13.7: Cosmos & Culture]

(32) Colombo, M., Bucher, L., & Sprenger, J. (2017). Determinants of Judgments of Explanatory Power: Credibility, Generality, and Statistical Relevance. Frontiers in Psychology, 8: 1430.

(31) Wright, C., Colombo, M., & Beard, A. (2017). HIT and Brain Reward Function: A Case of Mistaken Identity (Theory)History and Philosophy of Science Part CStudies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences. 64, 28-40. [preprint]

(30) Colombo, M., & Hartmann, S. (2017). Bayesian Cognitive Science, Unification, and ExplanationThe British Journal for Philosophy of Science, 68, 451-484 [preprint]

(29) Colombo, M. (2017). Experimental Philosophy of Explanation Rising. The case for a plurality of concepts of explanationCognitive Science, 41, 503-517. [preprint]

(28) Colombo, M., Bucher, L., & Sprenger, J. (2017). Determinants of judgments of explanatory power: Credibility, Generalizability, and Causal Framing. In G. Gunzelmann, A. Howes, T. Tenbrink, & E. J. Davelaar (Eds.). Proceedings of the 39th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society (pp. 1806-1811) Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society. [preprint]

(27) Colombo, M. (2017). Social motivation in computational neuroscience. Or if brains are prediction machines, then the Humean theory of motivation is false. In J. Kiverstein (Ed.) Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of the Social Mind (pp. 320-340). New York: Routledge. [preprint]

(26) Colombo, M. & Wright, C.D. (2017). Explanatory Pluralism: An Unrewarding Prediction Error for Free Energy TheoristsBrain and Cognition, 112, 3-12. [preprint]

(25) Colombo, M. (2017). Why Build a Virtual Brain? Large-Scale Neural Simulations as Jump Start for Cognitive ComputingJournal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence, 29, 361-370. [preprint]

(24) Colombo, M. (2016). Animal grieving and human mourning Commentary on King on Animal Grief. Animal Sentience 2016.110

(23) Colombo, M., Postma, M., & Sprenger, J. (2016). Explanatory Judgment, Probability, and Abductive Inference. In Papafragou, A., Grodner, D., Mirman, D., & Trueswell, J.C. (Eds.). Proceedings of the 38th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society (pp. 432-437). Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society. [preprint]

(22) Colombo, M., Bucher, L., & Inbar, Y. (2016). Explanatory Judgment, Moral Offense, and Value-Free Science. An Empirical StudyThe Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 7, 743–763. [This article has been discussed in Cultura 3.0 and in Imperfect Cognitions]

(21) Colombo, M. (2015). Why Build a Virtual Brain? Large-scale Neural Simulations as Test-bed for Artificial Computing Systems. In D.C. Noelle, R. Dale, A.S. Warlaumont, J. Yoshimi, T. Matlock, C.D. Jennings, & P.P. Maglio (Eds.), Proceedings of the 37th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society (pp. 429-34). Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society. [preprint]

(20) Colombo, M. (2015). For a Few Neurons More. Tractability and Neurally-Informed Economic ModellingThe British Journal for Philosophy of Science, 66, 713-736.[preprint]

(19) Colombo, M., Hartmann, S., & van Iersel, R. (2015). Models, Mechanisms, and Coherence. The British Journal for Philosophy of Science, 66, 181-212. [preprint]

(18) Colombo, M., & Sprenger, J. (2014). The Predictive Mind and Chess-Playing. A Reply to Shand (2014). Analysis, 74, 603-608. [preprint]

(17) Colombo, M., Stankevicius, A., & Seriès, P. (2014). Benefits of social vs. non-social feedback on learning and generosity. Results from the Tipping GameFrontiers in Psychology, 5: 1154.

(16) Colombo, M. (2014). Neural Representationalism, the Hard Problem of Content, and Vitiated Verdicts. A Reply to Hutto & Myin (2013)Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 13, 257-274. [preprint]

(15) Colombo, M. (2014). Explaining Social Norm Compliance. A Plea for Neural RepresentationsPhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences13: 217-138. [preprint]

(14) Colombo, M. (2014). Deep and Beautiful. The Reward Prediction Error Hypothesis of DopamineStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 45, 57-67. [preprint]

(13) Colombo, M.(2014). Caring, the Emotions, and Social Norm ComplianceJournal of Neuroscience, Psychology, and Economics, 7, 33-47 [preprint]

(12) Colombo, M. (2014). Two Neurocomputational Building Blocks of Social Norm ComplianceBiology and Philosophy, 29, 71-88. [preprint]

(11) Lisciandra, C., Postma-Nilsenová, M., & Colombo, M. (2013). Conformorality. A Study on Group Conditioning of Normative JudgmentThe Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 4, 751-764. [preprint]

(10) Colombo, M. (2013). Moving Forward (and Beyond) the Modularity Debate. A Network PerspectivePhilosophy of Science, 80, 356-377.[preprint]

(9) Colombo, M. (2013). Leges Sine Moribus Vanae. Does Language Make Moral Thinking Possible? Biology and Philosophy, 28, 501-521. [preprint]

(8) Colombo, M. (2013). Constitutive Relevance and the Personal/Subpersonal Distinction. Philosophical Psychology, 26, 547-570. [preprint]

(7) Colombo, M., & Seriès, P. (2012). Bayes in the Brain. On Bayesian Modelling in NeuroscienceThe British Journal for Philosophy of Science, 63, 697-723. [preprint]

(6) Colombo, M. (2010). How ‘Authentic Intentionality’ can be enabled. A Neurocomputational HypothesisMinds and Machines, 20, 183-202. [preprint]

(5) Colombo, M. (2009). What Can Neuroscience Offer to Economics? Humana.Mente: Journal of Philosophical Studies, 10, 41-59. [Invited] [pdf]

(4) Colombo, M. (2009). Looking at the Roots of Cooperation through the Brain, and What We Find There. In Gabbay, M. (Ed.) BPPA09 Proceedings, 15-26.

(3) Colombo, M. (2009). Does Embeddedness Tell Against Computationalism? A Tale of Bees and Sea Hares. AISB09 Proceedings of the 2nd Symposium on Computing and Philosophy, 16-21.

(2) Colombo, M. (2008). No-Brainer Predictions. Predictive Models in the Ultimatum GameRerum Causae Journal of the LSE Philosophy Society, 1, 42-50. [pdf]

(1) Di Francesco, M., Motterlini, M., & Colombo, M. (2007). In search of the neurobiological basis of decision-making: Explanation, Reduction and EmergenceFunctional Neurology, 22, 197-204. [Invited]    [pdf]

Advertisements